First, Google, not Apple, should be very, very concerned about this development. Amazon has basically taken Google’s engineering resources / output and said “thank you for your free work, we’ll take it from here.” How many times did Amazon mention Android in the device description? Does the device look at all like an Android device? Does it offer any Google services by default? Will Google have to pay to be the default search on a tablet that was designed using Google software (think about the irony in that)?

Second, this leaves most other tablet vendors still scratching their heads about what to do, and this is the best example of asymmetrical competition. I would elaborate, but John Gruber had this excellent paragraph from his post that sums is nicely already:

Attack from a position of strength. Build on your previous successes. That’s what Apple does. That’s what Amazon is doing here. The other guys — the Samsungs, HTCs, Motorolas, RIMs — can’t match Apple’s hardware design, don’t even try to match Apple in terms of original and differentiated software, and struggle to match Apple’s prices because they don’t have the economy of scale advantages Apple does. Those guys can’t match Amazon either, because they have no content to sell. Amazon can give away the razor because they’re already in the business of selling blades. The other guys don’t even have blades to sell.

For one thing, if hardware vendors and distribution partners find consumer interest lacking, Google will have to sweeten the incentives for them to keep churning out hardware and pushing it through retail. Pogue’s review does a very good job summarizing the current issues with the offering, which will likely tank sales; the bigger question is whether Google’s philosophy and vision with Chrome can materialize in the broader ecosystem – that is, a browser as the OS paradigm of computing. This seems quaintly a very desktop centric view of the world; with all kinds of mobile devices gaining broad adoption, why should we continue to expect the browser at front and center of how consumers access the Internet?

There is no destined outcome in terms of the “native” versus. “browser” “war”; this is dependent on how the players in each camp fight for ecosystem support and consumer adoption. And that’s where Google’s own hedge against Chrome – Android – is the second major factor against Chromebook’s potential. The managers running Android and Chrome will probably characterize their respective businesses as in a “friendly competition”; however, when they are competing in anything from internal engineering resources, corporate budgets, to external hardware partners and developer support, it shouldn’t be a big surprise that outsiders will see a lot of conflicted messages, and therefore question the strategy.

Count me a skeptic.

It’s true that Google has a strategy of commoditizing adjacent markets to turn them into ad-based businesses, which falls into its sweet spot. Many of Google’s most successful products besides its core search are of this nature: email, maps etc. GIving away Android for free is certainly commoditizing the mobile handset market: of the 300k daily activation number which Google touts, people speculate a large portion are what analysts traditionally call “unbranded” or “other” phones. In general this conforms to Google’s strategy; however, the flaw here is that in my view Android is disrupting other branded manufacturers like Nokia / Samsung / Motorola far more than it is challenging Apple and iOS devices. In other words, it may appear that Android is mainly a counter to the iPhone, but in reality it is killing Apple’s main branded competitors.

Allow me to expand on this point, because it probably appears counter-intuitive. Before Android powered smartphones hit the market, Apple was certainly in a league of its own with the iPhone. While it was rapidly capturing share of device profits (the famous 5% unit volume – 40% profit share charts), the incumbent device brands – Nokia et al. – still had the comfortable mid to low end market volumes, which would give them time to develop competing OSes. Now along comes Android, which, while it gave them a quick boost in terms of time to market of credible iOS challenger devices, also opened the floodgates to a whole range of unbranded competitors. These new comers – Huawei, ZTE etc. – play the same volume game as Nokia / Samsung et al. And we know so far Samsung / Motorola have not drastically reversed their financial performance thanks to Android – so what’s the next possible scenario? Would it be possible they continue to slip in unit volume, and be weakened further at the onslaught of the Android clones?

At the same time, I think Apple is sufficiently differentiated from the unbranded players  in terms of value propositions (very different consumer segments), so the Android clones do not pose a significant threat to Apple.

The flaw here is that Google did not limit who could use Android – a complete lack of platform control. If Google’s strategy does indeed include undermining Apple, it should have limited Android to a handful of brands, so they could compete effectively with Apple. Furthermore, I would also argue that Apple’s primary issue currently is not Android, but its own supply chain and distribution restrictions (e.g. AT&T exclusivity). The big fanfare of Android activation numbers have done little to stop iPhone stockouts all over the world – in China where the iPhone 4 is obscenely priced, supply is still tight. Admittedly I don’t have conclusive data on iPhone supply constraints – but if we take this assumption as true (and there are certainly indicators and proxies in favor of this), it would show that Android has done very little to halt Apple, and is causing far more headaches to Samsung etc.

The second fundamental flaw is that going back to the original strategy, carriers still stand in the way of Google’s profit realization, if and when the mobile devices are completely commoditized (the death of Apple and RIM). Mobile network operators have far greater influence over consumers than wireline operators – in most cases, people choose a mobile operator first before choosing a handset (Apple being the prime exception / disruption), whereas you choices over which wireline operator and which computer brand to buy are completely separate decisions. Because mobile operators “own” the consumers, market power dynamics dictate that Google cannot expect to extract substantial profits. I know this sounds abstract, but until Google can demonstrate to operators that “I can make your customers leave you for another operator”, operators could and should squeeze mobile advertising profits out of Google. Again, Google’s lack of control expedites this – Verizon can sign up Bing as the default search on its phones etc, but there also are many other ways to play this profit squeezing game.

Of course, Google could hope for a “Wintel”-like end-game, where they dominate the OS space and split the spoils with the operators; but operators can foreclose that outcome by actively playing one OS off another. I’m sure strategists at the operators are already plotting this out, and I wouldn’t be surprised if Nokia, which has long been an outsider to the US market, is called in by the operators to facilitate a bigger and better OS war.

Personally, I believe that on so many layers, this topic is really a non-topic. It provides entertainment value, no doubt, in the form of daily tech soap opera (bloggers jumping on every new data point released and typically extrapolating it beyond meaningfulness to arrive at flame-bait headlines). But from an industry analysis point of view, or a company analysis point of view (scrutinizing Apple / Google), the market share comparisons are really just one data point – it’s meaningful, but certainly not to the degree that the blogosphere claims it to be. Apple’s future is not in jeopardy if iPhone loses pole position to Android.

Over at Wired, Fred Vogelstein takes a crack at this topic. His main point is that if you sum up all the iOS devices (iPhone, iPod Touch, iPad), they are still outselling Android, by as much as 42%. While this may be encouraging to the Apple camp, there is no reason we can expect this to hold, especially when other Android powered devices (e.g. Android tablets) eventually hit the market.

I don’t have any doubt that Android devices will outsell iOS devices. If it hasn’t happened already, it will happen soon. There is no reason to believe an OS from a premium manufacturer (Apple) with an extremely limited range of SKUs can outsell, on a pure volume basis, an OS that is free to use and which is backed by some of the biggest consumer electronics companies in the world. On a dollar value basis, it might be a different story, but still not that likely. On a dollars of profit generated basis though, highly possible (Apple generates more profit than rest of mobile industry combined, with only 3% unit volume share).

That said, the main reason people are obsessed with these market share numbers seem to be the underlying assumption that iPhone and its eco-system will lose its draw to developers, and by extension to consumers, if it is relegated to a minority market share. I think there are at least a couple of counter-arguments to make here.

First of all, being the minority market share platform does not translate into a lack of quality apps, to the extent that it will hamper mass-premium consumers’ (Apple’s core segment) interest in the platform. For example, if you flip the argument over the number of apps in the Android vs. iPhone app stores on its head, you may well say that even though Android has a smaller number of apps, the eco-system is already sizable enough, so that for any functionality there will be “an app for that”. Another example would be none other than Macs – what’s the market share that Mac OS holds in all personal computers? Single digits? Do mainstream Mac users complain about the lack of quality apps (note the emphasis on mainstream – specific categories like hardcore gaming is lacking on the Mac, but even that is seeing improvement)? Holding these two examples, I would argue that with the developer community Apple has already amassed, it would be hard to foresee a drastic dying out of quality apps, even if Android floods the market.

Secondly, if you take a step back and look at the broader trend in computing, it is definitely headed in the direction of platform-agnostic. Some tech purists would even decry the whole notion of apps – everything should be realized on the browser, over the web. If you look at the desktop space, there is indeed the trend of “fat” clients (local apps) losing out to “thin” clients. Indeed, Google is perhaps one of the biggest proponents of this – its whole challenge to Microsoft is based on the browser. If we believe that the same trend will apply to mobile devices, then the apps craze we are experiencing really is just a transition phase – at some point, most of the apps you want would be delivered to you on the browser, as opposed to an app you download (again, Google’s Gmail mobile version on the browser is arguably better than Apple’s Mail app). And let’s give credit where credit is due – when Apple launched the iPhone in 2007, Steve Jobs’ initial vision was to have web apps (browser-based apps) instead of local apps. The app SDK and the app store only came out a year later, due to popular demand. (So you could say that Jobs had already envisioned an end-game where the browser was the point of delivery for apps, not the app store – his vision was perhaps just ahead of its time.)

If you sum these two arguments together, the bigger point is that iPhone will not lose its richness of apps in the face of Android capturing majority market share – it’s big enough already of a market so that there will be quality apps developed, and apps will be platform-agnostic anyway down the road. As long as Apple continue to bring innovation to its devices, it should not be overly worried about losing market share leadership – its whole strategy is founded on premium products, which implies that it won’t be market leader from a revenue / volume perspective. That’s why I wrote the headline of this post.

PS: Also, for people who continually say this will be a rerun of Apple vs. Windows in the 80s, please pause for a moment and reflect on the Mac’s continual resurgence over the last decade. This is again very indicative of the broader trend. In other words, one could almost claim that the “network effects” so famously championed by Wintel is close to becoming irrelevant, because the Internet has leveled the playing field for the small market share OSes.

PS2: And even if we are to talk of the platform wars of the 80s, we should get the facts straight. The following is my reply on a Quora question (similar topic really) awhile back:

First of all, it’s not really windows vs. mac, but PC vs. Mac. I would say by the time windows 3.0 came out, the platform war between PCs and Macs (at least the first war, not including Mac’s resurgence in recent years) was already over.

If you look at this article on Ars Technica, http://arstechnica.com/old/conte…
as early as 1986 PCs already had over 50% market share of computers, and it over-took the mac platform’s shares a few years before that. So in that sense, there never was a windows:mac war, at least not until very recently.

I think one key distinction between the platform wars of the 80s and android:iPhone is that in the 80s it was primarily driven by b2b, not b2c. IBM was late to the personal computers space, but they were the driving force behind making personal computers legitimate for business – they could go to a sales pitch with a business client with a perhaps inferior product but still sell it, and they could generate serious developer interest in developing for the PC. The killer apps of the 80s were spreadsheets and word-processors, sold to businesses. Apple could have better versions of such products on macs, but they couldn’t sell to businesses as quickly as IBM and clones like Compaq could, which is dictated by company structure and channel strategy – they are positioned as a consumer products company, and the only verticals where they made serious progress were education and publishing (where their products were clearly far far superior). That’s where the network effect kicked in and made Macs a niche.

Flash forward 25 years, and smartphone adoption is primarily driven by consumers, not businesses (blackberries being the exception). This is in Apple’s core area of expertise. It will still be challenging to fend off a group of competitors’ collective efforts (Samsung, HTC etc.), but as long as Apple retain a significant portion of the market, it will be in good shape. Apple doesn’t need to be market leader to be hugely profitable and have a sizable eco-system of 3rd party apps etc. – just look at macs today, as a general consumer you have majority of the apps you need to be happy with it (games being one major exception, which is also therefore a good business opportunity).

So back to your original question, I’d say Android:iPhone will play out very differently compared to Windows:Mac. Android might still end up with a more market share, but iPhone will have enough share and a big enough eco-system so that Apple won’t have to go through the kind of existential challenge it had back in the mid 90s.

There is no doubt that Android has been a success, especially in terms of offering consumers more choices. US consumers now have a perhaps overwhelming number of smartphones to choose from, across the major carriers. This is certainly a great development.

What I want to focus on in this post, however, is looking at Android from the eco-system players’ perspective – Google, the handset manufacturers, the carriers, and the app developers. My position is that while Android is full of promise as a platform, some fundamental dynamics of the eco-system will make it very challenging to navigate, especially in terms of financial gains – at the end of the day, these players are in it to profit.

I would like to start by going through each player’s objectives from participating in the Android eco-system. Starting with Google, its objectives are:

• Gain a permanent foothold in mobile, ensuring Google’s future when the web becomes increasingly mobile-driven
• strategically, prevent dependence on Apple in mobile, limit its bargaining power
• Increase traffic to Google properties, most notably search, which will in turn grow Google’s ad revenue
• Offer users a consistent Google user experience across mobile devices
• “Lock” users into Gmail, Google Maps, Youtube etc. (think Microsoft shipping IE with Windows)
• Develop a mobile go-to-market channel for future Google products

In essence, it’s all about Android being the hook which will retain the user in using Google products.

What about the handset manufacturers’ objectives?

• Develop handsets that rival the iPhone’s value proposition, capture market share in the booming smartphone segment
• Differentiate from competitors
• Reduce OS R&D costs

And the carriers:

• Retain some degree of control in the device, unlike Apple’s terms with AT&T
• Prevent becoming “dumb pipes, up-sell users on carrier VAS (value-added services) such as mobile video, ring-tones, gaming etc.
• Reduce Apple’s bargaining power
• Differentiate from other carriers

There is one thing all players agree on – counter the iPhone; but beyond that, there are some immediate points of tension. As smartphones seem to converge on the single big touch-screen form factor, hardware manufacturers will find it increasingly difficult to differentiate in shape and design. In that sense, HTC / Motorola / Samsung would very much want to tweak the UI or customize the OS, but that would quickly run into conflict with Google’s wish to offer users a consistent experience; and practically speaking, UI may really be too much a core part of the OS for the manufacturers to customize. Hence, manufacturers face the dreaded prospect of following the footsteps of PC manufacturers – low differentiation leads to low profits.

At the same time, carriers and Google’s interests aren’t that well-aligned, either. Google recently shuttered its Nexus One online store, which was hailed to disrupt the status quo of handset distribution by offering a contract free model instead of the typical carrier-subsidized model. Obviously this did not please its carrier partners. On the flip side, carriers perennial fear of becoming “dumb pipes” drove them to loading up Android phones with hard-to-remove bloatware, which consumers generally dislike and probably is making Google cringe – and just serves as more ammo for Apple’s value proposition of a refined experience.

My point here is that the logical implication of these interlocking conflicts is compromise. Google aggressively wants Android to become the de facto mobile OS – so much so that not only is the OS free to manufacturers, Google is also reportedly sharing search revenue with carriers / manufacturers. (Pretty amazing that you can think of this as almost the opposite of Apple’s original iPhone terms, where Apple got a share of AT&T’s revenue.) Manufacturers will get away with deals such as putting a Baidu search box on the phone, which would obviously go against Google’s interests. Carriers will get to keep their finger in the OS.

Sometimes these compromises result in degraded user experience, such as bloatware. Most often, they call into question the financial returns on Android. It would be a very difficult task to model how much incremental revenue Google will generate by owning Android, as opposed to not owning an OS and just receiving mobile search traffic from all devices. Manufacturers will get to ride the smartphone boom for a while, but then will again be hard-pressed for innovation – again, the PC manufacturers come into mind. The biggest winner from all this seems to be the carriers – especially Verizon – they finally have options other than Apple, and they can keep their old business model.

Well, that was a temporary fix, as Google’s China ICP license is up for renewal, and they need to appease the Chinese government. Google is again trying to do so with a half-measure.

The Atlantic has a good summary of major tech blogs’ response. Opinions are somewhat divided on how things will progress, but if anything no one is talking about how moral and upright Google is, this time around. Good. In my original piece back in January I had argued how dubious Google’s stance was:

… a cyber-attack is illegal by any country’s law, whereas what is censored and what is not censored can be different due to country-specific issues like religion or in the case of China, politics. So for Google to use the hacker attacks as justification that it can’t tolerate Chinese censorship anymore is somewhat dubious, since this is not exactly the same issue.

Google’s latest announcement just further confirms my position. It seems that, after all, Google does care about its business prospects in China; but it appears to be too smart for its own good, trying to get away with both being morally righteous and doing business as usual.

Read this together with another piece of news today, which talks of Google’s ambitions for Android in China and India, and I’m starting to feel that Google internally does not have a coherent strategy for China. Obviously, having a row with the Chinese government is not good for business, especially when looked at from the Chinese perspective – nothing had changed in the government’s policy throughout the years of Google China’s existence, and Google’s January fit seemed completely out of left field (again, cyber-attacks and government censorship are very different things).

I remember a few months back, at an investors event in San Francisco, Kai-fu Lee, the former head of Google China, had mentioned in passing how his company – Innovation Works, a early stage VC / incubator – had a few projects that were basically picking up the development of Android in China after the Google debacle (if my memory serves me correctly). Essentially, quite a few Chinese companies are interested in Android, but dealing with Google has become a politically charged issue, so you’d almost have to have an intermediary. This is especially true of the major Chinese carriers – it is unthinkable to see China Mobile do a high profile partnership with Google while this political spat is ongoing.

Google needs to work out its priorities. If it wants business in China, it needs to drop its high talk and start showing genuine long-term commitment to the market – otherwise it will be hard to retain its Chinese business partners, and it will always be a distant second.

My biggest takeaway from Chirp was how ambitious the Twitter team is. For a company that has long been under critics’ fire for not having a business model, the core of its strategy remains surprisingly attached to “getting the product right” first. The company’s priorities, according to CEO Ev Williams, is “0. Infrastructure; 1. Friction-free; 2. Relevance; 3. Revenue.” Revenue was decidedly last on the list.

Infrastructure is easy to understand – Twitter has been hurt by scaling pains so many times that it makes sense that the company is focused on coping with the growth first and foremost. Friction-free is about making the service easier to use, especially in the context of retaining new users, which was Ev’s rationale for the Tweetie acquisition. Friction-free is also the thinking behind the @anywhere initiative – so that users can use Twitter anywhere on the web, and not be interrupted by having to open another web-page etc. Relevance is partly about search, and partly about new features such as location and annotations.

And this is where things start to get interesting. For a long time, Twitter itself did not have an inbuilt search function; a number of 3rd party developers offered competing Twitter search products. The leader of these products, Summize, was eventually acquired by Twitter; but as Ev described it at Chirp, it was more like a merge of equals (size of team etc.). While the Twitter team didn’t talk a lot about search, I felt the key to the service’s relevance, and future business model, would be search – how do you organize this world of information (to paraphrase Google’s mission) stored in the billions of tweets, so that value can be extracted?

This is by no means an easy task. The distinctiveness about Twitter is its timeliness – you can literally find out what’s going in the world right now. However, this also makes search, or any other type of data organization, technically complex. Annotations and other types of meta-data helps reduce the complexity, as well as efforts to understand the users’ intent – are you looking for info on a specific location or event – but it will still be a daunting problem. (Google and Bing has had access to Twitter’s data-stream for a while now, but whether it’s for lack of trying or the complexity of the issue, their current use of Twitter data in their search results seem largely inconsequential.)

Still, if the Twitter team can crack this nut, then they may have on their hands a truly blockbuster product. The beauty of Twitter is how many different usages people have come up with for it – as a communications tool, it is simply an enabler of numerous services. If they can make their information much more organized through search, then the value of the communication tool is enhanced, as well as the services built on top of it. The recent story of how Twitter can be used to predict box office success is just one example of the potential value.

(This post was written over several days so the thought-flow is somewhat broken.)

When I was interviewing for my summer internship, I got asked the question “if you had funding to build a new search engine, what would you do?” My response was you can either tackle the existing search problem through a drastically different algorithm, or focus on specific verticals (e.g. travel) or new markets (mobile, location). If we change the phrase “search engine” to “method of organizing information”, then certainly both Twitter and Facebook are taking on a differentiated approach from Google. While the three companies may at face value be in very discrete markets, they are on a unavoidable collision course in terms of competition. While Google is all about indexing the static web, Facebook and Twitter are built on the social web, and they may well grow to become the Google killer that many have been searching for.

This is not as far-stretched as you may think. Think about the last time you performed a search. Did you ask any friends first? Was it only when they said “I don’t know” that you replied, “don’t worry about it. I’ll just Google it.”? Google search is powerful and hugely useful, but only to the extent of how useful the static pages it indexes are. When you do a search on a specific question, you often have to tinker it a few times. Click on a few different search results. Read through them. Often the pages won’t have the answer to the exact question you have, but enough info to give you pieces of the puzzle so you can piece it together. This is still much, much more efficient compared to doing research at the library, but the power of the social web is that you are not confined to static pages and information – the odds are that there is some person out there who knows exactly the answer to your question, and the power of the social web is that it enables you to ask that person directly. Quite a few of the people I follow on Twitter use it as a magical search engine – you pose a question on Twitter and your followers answer it.

Of course, this is just one specific scenario where social web services such as Twitter and Facebook have the upper hand against Google (and for the many, many instances where you need static information Google is still the better option – e.g. what is the year that the US was founded); but it does highlight Google’s key vulnerability – its lack of presence in social. Be it Orkut, Wave or Buzz, Google has repeatedly shown its inability to come up with a competitive social networking product. Maybe Google simply doesn’t have the social genes in its DNA – which is fine, as for the foreseeable future they will still make a killing in Adwords/Adsense. But the danger for Google is that search gets demoted from a primary instinct into a secondary instinct, the same way that Kayak / Mobissimo / Bing Travel and other vertical search engines have made Google irrelevant in travel search. It will still be a huge market, but only a less efficient/user-friendly alternative. And it’s clear from Facebook this week and Twitter last week that these companies have huge ambitions too in organizing the world’s information – hence the competition will be inevitable.

One last note – while Facebook has seemed to garner much more attention and praise with its announcements, Twitter’s efforts, especially in mobile shouldn’t be disregarded. The news today that Twitter has acquired SMS service Cloudhopper may sound insignificant to those of us who are used to iPhone apps and 3G networks, but in the grand scheme of things SMS is still such a viable and active method of information delivery. It will be interesting to see how Twitter uses SMS to its advantage.

The second post shows a fairly slick youtube video of Flash on Android, through a Farmville demo:

If you look closely enough, you can see that 1) there is an issue with mouse hover-overs; 2) for a intensely interactive Flash app, there is “money left on the table” in the sense that it is not customized for touch and the controls feel clumsy (or maybe it’s just the demo person…).

Which leads me to the provocative title of this post. The whole demand for Flash on the iPhone and other mobile platforms is based on how it gives consumers the “real web.” However, if you think about the main uses of Flash, which is 1) video 2) games 3) ads, I would say that consumers don’t care about whether ads can be displayed, and as the above example illustrates, games (and other forms of highly interactive Flash usages) probably need to be redesigned anyway (which calls for custom apps). Which leaves video – and this is where the competitive landscape plays an interesting role. The biggest video site, Youtube, is owned by Google, and Google is definitely going for HTML5 + H.264 and moving away from Flash. (Tangent: Google is also getting some criticism for not truly supporting the open web, as H.264 is a licensed technology.)

So the bottom line is, while Flash has dominance on the web now, it definitely faces the danger of becoming completely irrelevant in the mobile space. This may not be a terrible thing – moving to a unified standard such as HTML5 and away from proprietary codecs – except of course for Adobe.

Haas MBA Google Trek 2010

Besides having a great time talking with the Googlers, I was also lucky enough to win one of the 5 Droids handed out in a surprise lottery (you can see the winners showing off their gear in the photo). The phone, targeted for developers, comes with a one-month free trial from Verizon, as well as a nice discount for a 1 year or 2 year contract.

This is the first Android handset I have used, having been a loyal iPhone user since January 2009. There are things I immediately like about the phone, and it really is almost a completely different experience from the iPhone. I know there are plenty of Droid reviews out there (since this device has been out for a quarter now), but here are some of my first impressions:

• Great support for Google products – really, no surprises here. The turn-by-turn navigation, a coveted app by many, could well be one of the killer apps for this device. (I am curious how well that works on the road, especially in areas with patchy reception – this was a key differentiation point Nokia was trying to emphasize for its Ovi Maps, where the maps are stored locally and require less data transmission – and therefore less dependence on reception – on the go.) And of course the Google Voice app is great, but it does make you wonder how Verizon feels about it.
• Background apps – Pandora while surfing? No problem. However, it’s not apparent what apps are running in the background, which could both be a drain on your battery and also a potential nuisance – I realized I was always on Google Chat, even though that wasn’t my intention.
• Poor support for business users. This is not a phone ready for corporate America. It supports Microsoft Exchange, but apparently the “corporate email” app doesn’t support search. That’s right. No inbox searching. That alone is enough for me to hold on to my iPhone. (I could, in theory, forward all my emails to Gmail, but I’m sure there are plenty of users like me out there who prefer to keep their work-email and gmail separate)
• Very slow charging on USB? I have a habit of carrying only the USB cord, and not the adapter, for my iPhone. For some reason, the Droid charges at a very slow pace via USB – something like 15% an hour, which is not satisfactory.
• The physical keyboard is redundant. Yes. I’ve gotten used to typing on virtual keyboards. Having to actually push down feels painful, and there is no auto-correct. In this regard I’d probably like the Nexus One a lot better.
• App market. Good number of apps already, most of the web2.0 services are present, but much less presence of old-school stuff – e.g. WSJ, FT, NYTimes etc.

Reading through the points above, it’s interesting to note how many of them are talking about consumers’ habits. For example the point about the keyboard – if I came from the blackberry world I probably would love the physical keyboard (remember all those people who hated the virtual keyboard on the iPhone when it first launched?), but I’ve grown accustomed to virtual keyboards. Same for the email search – my work-around would solve the problem, but it is asking me to change my behavior, so I have a strong distaste for it.

One final point – I want to comment on how fundamentally different the Droid is from the iPhone. I felt it was a phone for geeks and engineers. The UI was less polished, but there was much more that the user could customize (menus, widgets etc…) You need to spend time to play around with it. The iPhone, on the other hand, is a device ready for mass adoption. It’s frustrating for geeks who want to do all kinds of things (but can’t), but perfect for everyday users who can just use it intuitively. Very different philosophies, and therefore potentially a sharp divergence in consumer segments going forward.

I’ve just been on a Berkeley Haas MBA student trek to China, where one of the companies we visited was Google China (before the recent news broke). Having talked with several Googlers and also pondered on the issue for a bit on my flight back to Berkeley, I’d like to share a few thoughts on the still developing showdown regarding Google Inc.’s (NASDAQ: GOOG) Chinese operations:

1. As regards the abstract and philosophical issue of “what is the right thing for Google to do” — “abide by Chinese law” or stand by its “do no evil” mantra? — there is actually no right answer to this question. First off, most governments in the world adopt some form of censorship, and China is not the only country where Google has to abide by local law. Chinese netizens have pointedly dug out the 2008 news story in which Google assisted the Indian government in arresting an Indian man. Secondly, the argument made by Google 4 years ago when entering China (ie – that offering Chinese netizens access to limited information is better than no information) is still just as valid as the moral claims Google is now stating when threatening to exit China. As a poor analogy, should a man steal from a food bank if he sees lots of hungry people on the street? The act of stealing itself may be repulsive, but does the end (saving people’s lives) justify the means? I honestly believe this is an issue which you can side with either way and there is no right or wrong. Furthermore, a cyber-attack is illegal by any country’s law, whereas what is censored and what is not censored can be different due to country-specific issues like religion or in the case of China, politics. So for Google to use the hacker attacks as justification that it can’t tolerate Chinese censorship anymore is somewhat dubious, since this is not exactly the same issue.
2. Secondly, this confrontation helps highlight the different cultural differences that are important in business in the US and in China. On our recent student trek, every company (whether multinational or local) emphasized the huge difference in business culture – “it’s not right or wrong, it’s just different.” What I mean by this is that Google’s going public has made the Chinese government lose face, and this will only result in a lose-lose situation. If Google was pissed about the hacker attacks, it should have escalated that to the relevant US government agencies, and therefore go through official diplomatic channels. From the Chinese perspective, by breaching the regular channels and creating such a PR issue, Google has shown that it has no respect for China, its government, or even its people. Just a quick glance at my friends’ statuses on Kaixin, the most popular Chinese SNS, and I can see just as many people who are sad and “mourning” for Google as there are who are angry and skeptical of Google claiming the moral high ground (“just leave”). Google has arguably alienated some Chinese netizens by escalating this political disagreement into a high-profile media story.
3. Thirdly, what is the fallout? A few possible scenarios are as follows (my own speculation, neither confirmed nor denied by my chats with Googlers):

• “Worst case” scenario: Google China is completely disbanded, all .cn services sare hut down, and all employees are let go (or for some people, offered transfers to the US); the aftermath is very likely that the Chinese government will block Google.com for an extended period of time to recover its lost face. Absolutely worst possible outcome, termed “lose-lose-lose” by the WSJ editorial.
• “Moderate case” scenario: Google’s .cn services are shut down, but Google China’s engineering staff is kept on, in a pure R&D center (think Microsoft Research Asia). Some form of comprise will be reached between the Chinese government and Google, and Google.com will remain accessible but prone to occasional blocks in China.
• “Best case” scenario: Business as usual. Somehow all parties get out of this political row with something to show, and everyone can forget that the whole thing even happened. This is only “best” in that we can go back to our prior state, not necessarily “best” in the moral and philosophical debate about censorship etc.

In closing, I’d like to say that the current events are unfortunate by any measure, since the biggest losers potentially are the Chinese netizens. Competition is necessary for a healthy market, and letting Baidu, Inc. ((ADR) NASDAQ: BIDU) own the Chinese search market is just as bad as letting Google own the US search market. This is why I root for Google in China and Microsoft Corporation’s (NASDAQ: MSFT) Bing in the US.